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THE PRESIDENT AS LAWMAKER: MODERATING 
EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY IN WARTIME
Daniel Silverberg1
 
“This Constitution, and the Laws of  the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; 
and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of  the United States, shall be the 
supreme Law of  the Land;”
       - Article VI, Section 2, U.S. Constitution 
introduction
 In 2008, the Supreme Court in Medellin v. Texas refused to set aside the execution of  a 
Mexican national, even though the President personally ordered Texas to ‘stand down’ in light of  
international legal concerns.2  Embedded in the Supreme Court’s decision was a subtle, yet deeply 
impactful commentary on the President’s role as lawmaker – the authority of  the President to 
set aside state law based on the Executive’s “exclusive” role in foreign affairs.3  This article will 
examine judicial mediation of  the President’s independent authority to conduct foreign affairs.4  I 
will specifically examine why the Supreme Court gave the President wide berth to preempt state law 
based on the foreign affairs preemption doctrine in the 2003 American Insurance Ass’n v. Garamendi5 
1 Daniel Silverberg is a lawyer in the House of  Representatives. The views expressed in this article are his own and do 
not represent the views of  the U.S. House of  Representatives, any committees therein, or the U.S. Government generally. 
The author wishes to thank Gaurav Laroia for his ceaseless insight and assistance on this paper.
2 Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008).
3 See Robert J. Reinstein, The Limits of  Executive Power, 59 am. u. l. rev. 259, 295 (2009), for an overview of  the 
authority of  the President in Foreign Affairs (citing louis henkin, Foreign aFFairs and the constitution (1972) 
(discussing modern jurisprudence of  presidential powers in foreign affairs). See also harold koh, the national 
security constitution: sharing Power aFter the iran-contra aFFairs (2009), for a discussion on the restraints of  
the President’s execution of  foreign affairs.
4 For an extraordinarily timely and systematic review of  legal constraints on Presidential authority, see Curtis A. 
Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Presidential Power, Historical Practice, and Legal Constraint, 113 colum. l. rev. 1097 (2013). 
See also Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 at 139 (1866) (Chase, C.J. dissenting) (“The power to make the necessary laws is in 
Congress; the power to execute in the President.”). For recent case law citing the President’s foreign affairs power, see 
American Ins. Assn. v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003) (discussing case law citing the President’s foreign affairs power.); 
Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung AG, 578 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Movsesian I”). For an academic discussion, see 
Carolyn A. Pytynia, Forgive Me, Founding Fathers for I Have Sinned: A Reconciliation of  Foreign Affairs Preemption After Medellin 
v. Texas, 43 vand. J. transnat’l l. 1413, 1420 (2010); Celeste Boeri Pozo, Foreign Affairs Power Doctrine Wanted Dead or 
Alive: Reconciling One Hundred Years of  Preemption Cases, 41 val. u. l. rev. 591 (2007); Amir M. Tikriti, Beyond The Executive 
Agreement: The Foreign Policy Preference Under Movsesian and the Return of  the Dormant Foreign Affairs Power in Norton Simon, 38 
PePP. l. rev. 755, 760 (2011).
5 Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396.
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decision, but cabined that authority a mere five years later in Medellin v. Texas.6 I will conclude that 
the Court -- influenced by detainee litigation in the ensuing years between Garamendi and Medellin -- 
sought to narrow a potentially open-ended reading of  Garamendi with respect to executive power and 
limit the President’s role as lawmaker.7  
 The two cases involve an inverted fact pattern – in Garamendi, the Court determined that 
California infringed on executive foreign policy, whereas in Medellin, the Court concluded that the 
executive infringed on state law.  Nonetheless, the legal argument underlying both cases was the 
same: the Executive may preempt state law based on longstanding claims settlement authority and 
Executive preeminence in foreign affairs.8  In fact, the United States in Medellin relied on Garamendi 
to assert the President’s authority to set aside state law based on foreign policy considerations.9  
These cases are important because they serve as bookends for a subtle shift in power between the 
political branches since September 11, 2001.  The decisions are not about federalism– even though 
both cases involved federal policy pitted against state law – but rather about the scope of  executive 
authority to “make law,” either in the form of  preempting state statute or, in the case of  Medellin, 
enforcing a non-self-executing treaty.10  In fact, the Court explicitly deferred addressing questions of  
federalism in Medellin and instead focused on the narrow issue of  executive lawmaking.11  The Court, 
echoing its holdings in the detainee cases, made clear that the President impermissibly crosses a line 
into lawmaking when he acts outside his constitutional or congressionally delegated authority.12   
 I will describe the Garamendi and Medellin decisions in depth in Part I, but I want to outline 
the basic narrative here to highlight the Court’s contrasting approach on the scope of  the President’s 
foreign affairs power.  The Garamendi decision involved a California state statute – the Holocaust 
Victim Insurance Relief  Act of  1999 -- that required insurance companies doing business in the 
6 Medellin, 552 U.S. at 525 (“Indeed, the President’s power to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea 
that he is to be a lawmaker.”).
7 Id. (citing Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 591) (“[t]he power to make the necessary laws is in Congress; the 
power to execute in the President.”). The Court in Medellin specifically referenced Hamdan and Ex parte Milligan to stress 
that lawmaking authority rests exclusively with the legislative branch. For a discussion on concerns regarding Garamendi’s 
expansion of  the scope of  federal power, see Brannon P. Denning & Michael D. Ramsey, American Insurance Association v. 
Garamendi and Executive Preemption in Foreign Affairs, 46 wm. & mary l. rev. 825, 950 (2004), cited in Cindy Galway Buys 
& Grant Gorman, Movsesian v. Victoria Verischerung and the Scope of  the President’s Foreign Affairs Powers to Preempt Words, 32 N. 
ill. u. l. rev. 205, 214 (2012).
8 Medellin, 552 U.S. 491.
9 Id. at 523.
10 See Medellin, 552 U.S. at 525 n.13 (“The dissent refrains from deciding the issue, but finds it ‘difficult to believe that 
in the exercise of  his Article II powers pursuant to a ratified treaty, the President can never take action that would result 
in setting aside state law.’ Post, at 564, 170 L. Ed. 2d, at 247. We agree. The questions here are the far more limited ones 
of  whether he may unilaterally create federal law by giving effect to the judgment of  this international tribunal pursuant 
to this non-self-executing treaty, and, if  not, whether he may rely on other authority under the Constitution to support 
the action taken in this particular case. Those are the only questions we decide.”).
11 Id. at 525.
12 Id. at 524 (“Such considerations, however, do not allow us to set aside first principles. The President’s authority 
to act, as with the exercise of  any governmental power, ‘must stem either from an act of  Congress or from the 
Constitution itself.’”).
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state to disclose the names of  Holocaust-era insurance policies.13  The case stemmed from the 
alleged failure of  European companies to pay out the policies of  Holocaust victims.14  The insurance 
association representing the key litigant – Generali -- argued the law interfered with a federal foreign 
policy of  negotiation, since the U.S. had backed a claims settlement process and signed executive 
agreements with several European countries on the matter.15  
 The court assessed two doctrines – conflict preemption and field preemption – to determine 
whether the statute interfered with the federal government’s exclusive responsibility for foreign 
affairs.16  The former – conflict preemption – involves a state law in direct conflict with an express 
foreign policy.  The latter, more controversial doctrine, posits that even in the absence of  any 
express federal policy, a state law may still be preempted under the foreign affairs doctrine if  it 
intrudes on the field of  foreign affairs without addressing a traditional state responsibility.17  
 The Court ultimately concluded that the statute was preempted because of  a direct conflict 
with an express federal policy of  negotiation in the insurance cases.18  To the extent the statute 
intruded on the President’s authority to conduct foreign affairs as he sees fit, with no traditional state 
responsibility, the State of  California had to step aside.19  However, the Court inferred the ‘express’ 
policy from the executive agreements and from Administration officials’ statements.20  It made clear 
that no express congressional action was necessary to provide a basis for preemption when the state 
law conflicts with executive foreign policy.21  
 Five years later, in Medellin v. Texas, the Supreme Court backtracked from this approach. 
It insisted on a statutory basis for the President to preempt state law based on an exercise of  the 
President’s authority to conduct foreign affairs or, in the alternative, longstanding claims settlement 
authority.22  Texas intended to execute a Mexican national who alleged that the state failed to inform 
13 Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 409.
14 Id.
15 Id. at 406 n.2.
16 Id. at 419.
17 Id. at 420 (“The principal support for this claim of  preemption is Zschernig v. Miller. . . . In invalidating an Oregon 
statute, the Zschernig majority relied on statements in previous cases that are open to the reading that state action with 
more than incidental effect on foreign affairs is preempted, even absent any affirmative federal activity in the subject area 
of  the state law, and hence without any showing of  conflict.”).
18 Id. at 399-400.
19 Id. at 421; see also Reinstein, supra note 3, at 332-334 (“. . . the California law was nullified because it interfered with 
the President’s ability to conduct foreign affairs as he saw fit—that is, the President’s policy was to settle the claims 
through voluntary means and not through litigation.”).
20 Id. at 422 (“This position, of  which the agreements are exemplars, has also been consistently supported in the high 
levels of  the Executive Branch, as mentioned already.”).
21 See id. at 423 n.14 (“It is true that the President in this case is acting without express congressional authority . . . But 
. . . the President possesses considerable independent constitutional authority to act on behalf  of  the United States on 
international issues, and conflict with the exercise of  that authority is a comparably good reason to find preemption of  
state law.”).
22 For a discussion on the divergent conclusions of  the two cases, see Tikriti, supra note 4 at 783-84, citing Reinstein, 
supra note 3, at 333 (“In effect, Medellin narrowed the scope of  the Garamendi decision despite the fact that ‘Medellin was 
a much stronger case . . . for the invalidation of  a state law.’”); Pytynia, supra note 4, at 1429 (“Four short years later, 
in Medellin the Supreme Court seemed to completely undermine its rationale in Garamendi.)”. See also Michael Stokes 
Paulsen, The Constitutional Power to Interpret International Law, 118 yale l.J. 1762, 1799 (2008-09) (highlighting inconsistent 
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him of  his consular rights under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. President Bush 
subsequently issued a Memorandum – self-described as “unprecedented” in subsequent court briefs 
-- to the State of  Texas requiring that Texas reexamine Medellin’s sentence in light of  an International 
Court of  Justice decision on the matter.23  Texas refused. The decision rose to the Supreme Court, 
before which the United States argued that the President’s preeminent role in foreign affairs 
militated a reading of  applicable treaties as “delegating” authority to the President to implement 
those agreements, even if  the treaties were not self-executing on their face.24 
 The Court concluded that only Congress could convert a non-self  executing treaty into a 
self-executing one – not the President.25  The court expressly rejected the claim that the President 
could unilaterally preempt state law – in effect, legislating - based on the President’s “unique” foreign 
policy responsibilities:
                                                                                         26
 The Court also rejected the President’s secondary argument – that the memorandum was 
justified in light of  the executive’s claims settlement authority. It refused to infer congressional 
acquiescence from congressional inaction.27  In the process, the Court limited the Garamendi decision 
to the context of  claims settlement, specifically where the President had signed an executive 
agreement.28  
conclusions of  the two cases) (“Simply put, the reasoning of  Medellin v. Texas refutes the false claims of  Dames & Moore 
and Garamendi. If  the President may not unilaterally make a non-self-executing treaty into a binding U.S. domestic law 
obligation, he surely may not unilaterally make an executive agreement into a binding U.S. domestic law obligation.”).
23 See 552 U.S. at 498 (“After the Avena decision President George W. Bush determined …that the United States would 
‘discharge its international obligations’ under Avena ‘by having State courts give effect to the decision.’”).
24 See Reply Brief  for Petitioner at 12, Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008) (No. 06-984) (“Because the President was 
unquestionably in the best position to weigh the strength of  those competing considerations, and to balance them in 
light of  global foreign policy concerns, the applicable treaties are logically understood as delegating to the President the 
authority to strike the appropriate balance for the nation.”).
25 See Medellin, 552 U.S. at 525-26 (“The responsibility for transforming an international obligation arising from a non-
self-executing treaty into domestic law falls to Congress.”).
26 Id. at 529 (“The United States also directs us to the President’s “related” statutory responsibilities and to his 
‘established role’ in litigating foreign policy concerns as support for the President’s asserted authority to give the ICJ’s 
decision in Avena the force of  domestic law. Congress has indeed authorized the President to represent the United States 
before the United Nations, the ICJ, and the Security Council, 22 U.S.C. § 287, but the authority of  the President to 
represent the United States before such bodies speaks to the President’s international responsibilities, not any unilateral 
authority to create domestic law.”).
27 See id. at 531-32 (“Past practice does not, by itself, create Executive power”).
28 See id.; see also Michael D. Ramsey, International Wrongs, State Laws and Presidential Policies, 32 loy. l.a. int’l & comP. 
The United States maintains that the President’s constitutional 
role “uniquely qualifies” him to resolve the sensitive foreign policy 
decisions that bear on compliance with an ICJ decision and “to do 
so expeditiously”… Such considerations, however, do not allow us to 
set aside first principles. The President’s authority to act, as with the 
exercise of  any governmental power, “must stem either from an act of  
Congress or from the Constitution itself.” 
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 Why in the Garamendi case did the Majority defer to the “independent constitutional 
authority” of  the President to preempt state law based on foreign affairs concerns, and then 
expressly reject that rationale in the Medellin case? In fact, critics argue Medellin “was a stronger case 
for the invalidation of  a state law” because the state law was in direct conflict with a treaty obligation 
(not an executive agreement), and the President’s policy was explicit rather than implied from a series 
of  agreements and statements.29  After all, the policy was spelled out in a Presidential memorandum, 
not cobbled together through sub-Cabinet level statements and executive agreements, as was the 
case in Garamendi.30  Why, in two cases involving similar factors – an executive foreign policy in 
conflict with state law and a lack of  express congressional action -- did the Supreme Court reach 
entirely different conclusions? 
 The simple answer is that one decision involved state criminal law – the inner sanctum 
of  state jurisdiction -- the other a vague compilation of  Executive statements.31  One might also 
posit that the decision was a result of  the changed composition of  the Court since 2004, and, as 
proposed by Professor Noah Feldman, that the decision was a “sovereigntist” reaction, or perhaps 
a compromise, to the liberal-oriented Boumediene decision.32  However, the fact that the Majority 
focused on executive lawmaking rather than federalism – notwithstanding the addition of  two new 
justices – indicates that the Majority, particularly Justice Kennedy, had something else on their minds 
besides states’ rights and sovereignty.33  
 In part I of  this article I will argue that after struggling in the intervening four years with 
the President’s claims of  inherent authority in the detainee cases, the Majority was more resistant 
to arguments of  executive lawmaking authority than it had been in Garamendi, and it sought to 
l. rev. 19, 35-36 (2010) (“[T]he Court in Medellin (per Chief  Justice John Roberts) limited Garamendi to its facts (and 
indeed, to a somewhat recast version of  its facts). Garamendi, Roberts’ opinion began by saying, was one of  ‘a series 
of  cases in which this Court has upheld the authority of  the President to settle foreign claims pursuant to an executive 
agreement.’ ‘The claims-settlement cases,’ the Court continued, ‘involve a narrow set of  circumstances: the making of  
executive agreements to settle civil claims between American citizens and foreign governments or foreign nationals.’”).
29 See Tikriti, supra note 4 at 783-84, citing Reinstein, supra note 3, at 333, on why Medellin was a stronger case for 
preemption. Justice Ginsburg in her dissent in Garamendi lamented the ambiguous nature of  the executive agreements 
upon which the Majority relied to preempt. She observed that the executive agreements were silent on preemption and 
in no way indicated that litigation would be shelved as a consequence of  the agreements. In contrast, the Presidential 
Memorandum in the Medellin case was explicit regarding Executive policy. See Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 441 n.5 (Ginsburg, 
J. dissenting) (“[N]othing in the executive agreements suggests that the Federal Government supports the resolution of  
Holocaust era insurance claims only to the extent they are based upon information disclosed by ICHEIC. The executive 
agreements do not, for example, prohibit recourse to ICHEIC to resolve claims based upon information disclosed 
through laws like the HVIRA.”).
30 See Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 442 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“We should not [point to the same statements that the 
majority did]. . . lest we place the considerable power of  foreign affairs preemption in the hands of  individual sub-
Cabinet members of  the Executive Branch. Executive officials of  any rank may of  course be expected ‘faithfully [to] 
represen[t] the President’s policy,’ ante, at 156 L Ed 2d, at 401 n 13, but no authoritative text accords such officials the 
power to invalidate state law simply by conveying the Executive’s views on matters of  federal policy. The displacement 
of  state law by preemption properly requires a considerably more formal and binding federal instrument.”).
31 See id. at 532 (characterizing criminal law as “the heart of  the State’s police powers.”).
32 See generally Noah Feldman, When Judges Make Foreign Policy, n.y. times, Sep. 25, 2008, available at http://www.
nytimes.com/2008/09/28/magazine/28law-t.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
33 See Medellin, 552 U.S. at 523.
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foreswear a more robust interpretation of Garamendi proffered by the United States – that the 
President could rely on his “unique” constitutional responsibilities or executive agreements to 
preempt state law.34  From 2004 to 2008 – shortly after Garamendi -- the court considered and 
rejected the President’s claims of  inherent executive authority to amend federal statute.  The apex 
of  the Court’s rejection appeared in Hamdan, in which the Court reaffirmed the distinct authority of  
Congress to make law: “The power to make the necessary laws is in Congress; the power to execute 
in the President. Both powers imply many subordinate and auxiliary powers. . . . But neither can the 
President, in war more than in peace, intrude upon the proper authority of  Congress. . . .”35 
 The Majority in Medellin specifically referenced Hamdan for the proposition that the President 
cannot unilaterally enforce a non-self-executing treaty.36  The court’s narrowing of  Garamendi 
constituted either an expression of  exhaustion with the President’s claims of  lawmaking power, or a 
deliberate effort to rein in the President after the detainee cases.  In short, Medellin should be read as 
an extension of  Hamdan37 - that “[the President] may not disregard limitations that Congress has, in 
proper exercise of  its own powers, placed on his powers.”38  
 This wariness reflects a historical pattern of  the Court seeking cooperation among the 
political branches during wartime, when the executive may be inclined to overreach its authority. 
According to Trevor Morrison, “it is now commonplace to observe that in times of  national security 
crisis, the Court tends to privilege the joint actions of  the political branches.”39  The Judicial branch 
may countenance the passage of  legislation that it might otherwise find objectionable, but it will not 
uphold unilateral Executive action (or invalidate such assertions on civil libertarian grounds) unless 
the Executive “has involved the legislature in the equation” and remained within the bounds of  that 
legislation.40  In this case, after four years of  rejecting unilateral assertions of  Presidential power, the 
court demanded the President to partner with Congress rather than uphold the Garamendi precedent 
of  unilateral preemption of  state law. 
 In parts II and III, I will focus on two related concerns in the Garamendi decision. First, I will 
argue that the Majority in Garamendi misread congressional silence as acquiescence, an issue manifest 
34 The Medellin decision was decided two years after the decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, (2006), and 
less than two months before the decision in Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008), which capped a litany of  detainee-
related litigation. For a discussion on Medellin in the context of  the detention decisions, particularly the Court’s response 
to a novel assertion of  presidential power, see Trevor Morrison, Book Review: Constitutional Alarmism, 124 harv. l. rev. 
1688, 1705 (2011). Morrison examines the specific issue of  the President’s memorandum.
35 Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 591 (citing Ex Parte Milligan, 79 U.S. 2, 139-40 (1866)) (“The Constitution makes the President 
the ‘Commander in Chief ’ of  the Armed Forces, Art. II, § 2, cl. 1, but vests in Congress the powers to ‘declare War 
. . . and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water,’”); see also Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004); Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Boumediene. v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
36 See Medellin, 552 U.S. at 526.
37 This article focuses on the Administration’s conception of  Executive power, not the underlying views of  
international law or detainee operations. See Curtis A. Bradley, The Bush Administration and International Law: Too Much 
Lawyering and Too Little Diplomacy, duke J. const. law & PuB. Pol’y 57, 61 (2009), (regarding the distinction).
38 Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 593 n.23.
39 Trevor W. Morrison, The Middle Ground in Judicial Review of  Enemy Combatant Detentions, 45 willamette l. rev. 453, 
453 (2009).
40 Id. at 454.
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in numerous decisions related to foreign affairs.41  The court failed to appreciate that congressional 
silence – particularly in the foreign affairs context – often stems from profound ambivalence 
on a policy or, possibly, disengagement on a matter that lacks political urgency. The subsequent 
controversy that surrounded Garamendi, including multiple failed efforts to pass legislation to reverse 
the decision, highlights how congressional inaction may reflect an interest in preserving the status 
quo or deep policy disagreement, not acquiescence to an Executive policy. To the extent the court in 
Medellin favored cooperation among the political branches, it narrowed Garamendi’s implication that 
Congress need not approve executive action where the President exercises his foreign affairs power, 
possibly even beyond the claims settlement arena. 
 Second, the Garamendi decision rendered further unclear how to discern an executive policy 
from the universe of  executive actions on a given subject, and the standards under which a court 
should find preemption given the existence of  a stated executive policy. The Garamendi decision 
reflects a splintered test for how to formalize executive policy, and, based on subsequent decisions, it 
remains unclear what exactly constitutes the kind of  ‘executive policy’ that may provide the basis for 
preemption.42  The court could have clarified the ambiguity in Movsesian but opted not to review the 
case.43  
 The legacy of  these cases extends beyond the claims settlement context.  Some posit 
the Garamendi decision created a new Youngstown test,44 with Congress no longer the fulcrum of  
executive authority.45  If  true, then Medellin constituted realignment – perhaps even a strengthening 
– of  congressional authority in foreign affairs – where “power is most implied and concurrent 
between the branches.”46  The Supreme Court dealt with these questions against the backdrop of  the 
Korean War in the Youngstown decision, and the Garamendi and Medellin decisions constitute similar 
cases in which the court made clear it wants the Executive Branch to collaborate with Congress 
rather than proceed unilaterally, at least outside of  the most narrow of  claims settlement cases.47  
41 E.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
42 See Jack Goldsmith, Statutory Foreign Affairs Preemption, 2000 suP. ct. rev. 175, 178 (2001) (“The Supreme Court’s 
preemption jurisprudence is famous for its incoherence. The doctrines of  preemption are vague and indeterminate. 
Their relations to one another are unclear. And the decisional outcomes are difficult to cohere.”).
43 See Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung AG, 670 F.3d 1067, (9th Cir. 2012) (“Movsesian II”); see also, Petition for Writ 
of  Certiorari at 28, Arzoumanian v. Munchener, 133 S.Ct. 2795, (2013) (No. 12-9) (arguing that the federal intent to 
preempt an entire field should not “be inferred lightly” and that “preemption is appropriate where the scheme of  federal 
regulation is ‘so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement 
it’” (quoting, inter alia, Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
44 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, (1952) (Jackson, concurring) (arguing Presidential 
authority can be evaluated in three ways: first, at its maximum acting in accordance with Congressionally granted 
authority; secondly, under concurrent authority with Congress where both Congress and the President have overlapping 
responsibilities; and thirdly, at its weakest, either without or in defiance of  Congressional authorization).
45 See Michael J. Turner, Fade to Black: the Formalization of  Jackson’s Youngstown Taxonomy by Hamdan and Medellin, 58 
am. u.l. rev. 665, 668 (2009) (“The recently decided case of  Medellin v. Texas is the latest Supreme Court case to affirm 
Justice Jackson’s three-part test as the appropriate framework to analyze executive power.”).
46 Id. at 694.
47 See Ramsey, supra note 28 at 24-25 (“the constitutional problem in Youngstown was not that the President 
independently formulated policy (something the President does all the time) but that the President tried to make that 
policy superior to existing law…The President, like the eighteenth-century English monarch, cannot use the executive 
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 This expectation is particularly relevant in light of  discussions to amend the 2001 
Authorization for the Use of  Military Force (AUMF).  In light of  expected U.S. withdrawal from 
Afghanistan, there are questions regarding the ongoing legal basis of  U.S. counterterrorism and 
detention operations currently conducted pursuant to the AUMF.48  Justice O’Connor indicated 
in Hamdi that detention authority pursuant to the AUMF is contingent on combat operations in 
Afghanistan.49  If  forces are no longer involved in active combat in Afghanistan, there is a question 
whether there is legal authority to detain: 
                                                                                                                                  50
At some point, the Judiciary may insert itself  into the discussions regarding the continued relevance 
of  the AUMF.
 Likewise, Medellin could inform how Congress views the scope of  its authority in the Iran 
nuclear negotiations.  In March 2014, 395 Members of  the US House of  Representatives sent a 
letter to the President insisting that he “consult closely” with Congress before finalizing a nuclear 
agreement with Iran.51  Several senators followed up with legislation requiring Congress to approve 
any deal,52 and numerous Members expressed frustration after the New York Times reported that 
the Administration might implement an agreement based on existing authority, with no immediate 
input from Congress.53  To the extent there is a strong disagreement between the branches regarding 
power to issue decrees with the force of  law.”).
48 See Hamdi, 542 U.S.at 521; see also, Karen DeYoung, Afghan war’s approaching end throws legal status of  Guantanamo 
detainees into doubt, wash. Post, Oct. 18, 2013, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/
afghan-wars-approaching-end-throws-legal-status-of-guantanamo-detainees-into-doubt/2013/10/18/758be516-2d0a-
11e3-97a3-ff2758228523_print.html (“‘In the words of  the Supreme Court, the authority to detain — if  you’re detaining 
based on someone being a belligerent — can unravel as hot wars end. And I think that’s a real question,’ Brig. Gen. Mark 
Martins, chief  prosecutor for military commissions at Guantanamo, said in a recent interview.”).
49 Hamdi, at 521 (“If  the record establishes that United States troops are still involved in active combat in Afghanistan, 
those detentions are part of  the exercise of  “necessary and appropriate force,” and therefore are authorized by the 
AUMF.”).
50 Id.; see also Curtis Bradley, The Death of  Bin Laden and the AUMF, (May 3, 2011), available at http://www.lawfareblog.
com/2011/05/the-death-of-bin-laden-and-the-aumf/.
51 Letter from Majority Leader Eric Cantor and Minority Whip Steny H. Hoyer to President Barack Obama, (Mar. 
5, 2014) available at http://www.democraticwhip.gov/sites/default/files/2014-03-05-letter-to-the-president-re-iran-
sanctions.pdf.
52 See e.g., S.2650, 113th Cong. (2014). The bill is best described in a press release from Senator Corker, Press Release, 
Sen. Bob Corker, Senators Seek Congressional Review and Enforcement of  Any Final Iran Nuclear Agreement, available 
at http://www.corker.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2014/7/senators-seek-congressional-review-and-enforcement-of-
any-final-iran-nuclear-agreement.
53 See David E. Sanger, “Obama Sees an Iran Deal that Could Avoid Congress,” n.y. times, Oct. 19, 2014, available at 
[W]e understand Congress’ grant of  authority for the use of  “necessary 
and appropriate force” to include the authority to detain for the 
duration of  the relevant conflict, and our understanding is based on 
longstanding law-of-war principles. If  the practical circumstances of  a 
given conflict are entirely unlike those of  the conflicts that informed 
the development of  the law of  war, that understanding may unravel. 
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the role of  Congress in approving any deal, Medellin could inform how Congress defines the scope 
of  its authority. 
 On a personal note, this article constitutes an effort to understand when and in what 
manner Congress should play an active role in foreign affairs.  Practically, the Garamendi and 
Medellin decisions highlight the urgency and accompanying pitfalls of  congressional deference to 
the Executive branch in foreign affairs. During my service as counsel on the House Foreign Affairs 
Committee, Members and their staffs struggled to balance the interests of  Holocaust survivors 
dismayed by the Garamendi decision, and the serious foreign policy implications of  state laws that 
potentially undermine federal policies.  I also observed the increasing frustration among Members 
of  Congress regarding unilateral Executive exercise of  authority in foreign affairs – and judicial 
deference to that authority.54  There was particular frustration on any given foreign policy matter 
regarding the Executive’s failure to adequately consult with Congress, which reinforced the sense 
that the Legislative branch failed to exercise its foreign affairs powers.  This article will hopefully 
shed light on the inner dynamics of  the Legislative Branch when it is confronted with a unilateral 
assertion of  executive authority in a shared area of  power. 
Part i. the President’s Foreign aFFairs PreemPtion Power 
a. Background
 The foreign affairs preemption power at issue in Garamendi and Medellin pits two 
constitutional principles against each other.  On one hand, the Supremacy Clause of  the 
Constitution expressly grants Congress alone the authority to preempt state law that intrudes on 
or is incompatible with the federal government’s legislative powers.55  Further, Article II of  the 
constitution vests the power to negotiate and enter into treaties with the President and ratification 
authority in the Senate.  This requirement, according to numerous scholars, was driven by the 
Founders’ interest in protecting state interests, checking executive power, and limiting the number of  
international commitments into which the United States entered.56  
 Simultaneously, the Constitution vests in the Executive the authority to conduct foreign 
affairs.57  This was a deliberate effort by the Founders to avoid the pitfalls of  the Articles of  
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/20/us/politics/obama-sees-an-iran-deal-that-could-avoid-congress-.html.
54 The starkest example rests in the war powers context, in which members voiced concerns regarding the President’s 
reliance on inherent executive authority to commence military operations, including in Libya and Yemen.
55 See U.S. Const. art. VI (“This Constitution, and the Laws of  the United States which shall be made in Pursuance 
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of  the United States, shall be the supreme 
Law of  the Land”); Ramsey, supra note 28.
56 See generally Curtis A. Bradley, Unratified Treaties, Domestic Politics, and the U.S. Constitution, 48 harv. int’l l.J. 307, 
320 (2007) (“Hamilton further contended that, ‘however proper or safe it may be in governments where the executive 
magistrate is an hereditary monarch, to commit to him the entire power of  making treaties, it would be utterly unsafe 
and improper to intrust the treaty power to an elective magistrate of  four years’ duration.”); Jack N. Rakove, Solving a 
Constitutional Puzzle: The Treatymaking Clause as a Case Study, 1 PersP. am. hist. 233, (1984).
57 See United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 233 (1942) (describing the inability for States in this country to decide 
foreign policy.) (“To permit it would be to sanction a dangerous invasion of  Federal authority.”); see also Movsesian II, 
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Confederation and establish a unified diplomatic instrument.58  Article II, §2 of  the Constitution 
authorizes the Executive branch to engage in key diplomatic functions, including treaty 
implementation and receipt of  ambassadors.59  The Supreme Court in the 20th Century gave wide 
berth to the Executive as the sole purveyor of  foreign affairs, to the dismay of  some experts.60  The 
Court made the point bluntly: “the Constitution gives the federal government the exclusive authority 
to administer foreign affairs.”61  
 What happens, however, when states seek to legislate on a matter that touches on foreign 
affairs, or when the President seeks to commit the United States to an agreement, without approval 
from Congress, in a matter of  foreign affairs?62  The Supreme Court over the last century fashioned 
a doctrine – “the foreign affairs doctrine” – to address exactly these scenarios. The origins of  
doctrine emerged in United States v. Curtiss-Wright,63 and specifically took shape with respect to claims 
settlement in United States v. Belmont, in which the Supreme Court upheld the President’s authority 
to bind the United States to an international agreement – outside the treaty process.64  The Court in 
Belmont concluded that the “complete power over international affairs is in the national government 
. . . and cannot be subject to any curtailment or interference on the part of  the several states.”65  The 
authority was modest at that point – merely the authority for the President to commit the United 
supra note 44 at 1071 (“Power over external affairs is not shared by the States; it is vested in the national government 
exclusively.”); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 63 (1941) (“The Federal Government, representing as it does the 
collective interests of  the forty-eight states, is entrusted with full and exclusive responsibility for the conduct of  affairs 
with foreign sovereignties…Our system of  government is such that the interest of  the cities, countries and states, no less 
than the interest of  the people of  the whole nation, imperatively requires that federal power in the field affecting foreign 
relations be left entirely free from local interference.”); Pytynia, supra note 4 at 1414.
58 See Denning, supra note 7 at 843 (“The natural effect of  making federal law supreme is that it overrides inconsistent 
state law.”); see also Buys, supra note 7, at 211 (describing a thorough history of  the foreign affairs preemption power).
59 U.S. Constitution. Art. II, § 2, (“ . . . he shall receive ambassadors and other ministers . . . ”).
60 See United States v. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. 304, (1936) (granting the President sweeping executive powers to 
handle the external business of  the United States); see also Pink, 315 U.S. at 233 (“Power over external affairs is not 
shared by the States; it is vested in the national government exclusively.”). Contra Koh, supra note 3, at 117 (criticizing this 
precedent).
61 See Movsesian II, supra note 43, at 1062 (“The power to conduct diplomatic relations and negotiations, like the 
war powers, is vested exclusively with the federal government. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8; id. at art. II, § 3. Absent explicit 
authorization, states may not modify or alter the nation’s foreign policy.”).
62 Id. at 1072 (“…[T]he Supreme Court has made clear that, even in the absence of  any express federal policy, a 
state law still may be preempted under the foreign affairs doctrine if  it intrudes on the field of  foreign affairs without 
addressing a traditional state responsibility.”).
63 Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319. This case is cited frequently for the principal that the President’s foreign relations 
authority is exclusive and not subject to the limitations of  other branches. (“Not only . . . is the federal power over 
external affairs in origin and essential character different from that over internal affairs, but participation in the exercise 
of  power is significantly limited. In this vast external realm with its important, complicated, delicate and manifold 
problems, the President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of  the nation.”).
64 See United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330 (1937) (the United States’ recognition of  the Soviet Union, even 
absent a ratified treaty, trumps state law). For general background on judicial views of  the President’s foreign affairs 
power, see Bradley & Morrison, supra note 4, at 1098 (discussing the differential role taken by courts in assessing 
presidential power), and Reinstein, supra note 3, at 295 (assessing the scope of  Executive authority in terms of  “royal 
prerogative of  foreign affairs” viewed by the Founding Fathers).
65 Belmont, 301 U.S. at 331.
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States via an executive agreement with a foreign government where there was either an independent 
constitutional power of  the president, a clear and unambiguous history of  congressional 
acquiescence, or clear statutory authority.66  Subsequent cases affirmed the power of  the President 
to settle claims via executive agreement, based on the federal government’s “exclusive” power 
in foreign affairs.67  In Youngstown, the Supreme Court made clear that the President can “act in 
external affairs without congressional authority”.68  In Dames & Moore (1981), the Court upheld the 
President’s claims settlement with Iran based on the “character” of  legislation and “acquiescence” 
of  Congress.69  
 The Court’s deference to the Executive’s claim settlement authority traditionally involved the 
signing of  an agreement,70 but one controversial case – Zschernig v. Miller – involved the preemption 
of  state law based on interference with the President’s “exclusive” ability to conduct foreign 
affairs, not based on an executive agreement, explicit federal action, or congressional approval.71  
The Supreme Court in that case struck down an Oregon statute on grounds that the law was 
“an intrusion by the State into the field of  foreign affairs which the Constitution entrusts to the 
President and the Congress.”72  The court concluded that state action with more than incidental 
effect on foreign affairs is preempted, even absent any affirmative federal activity in the subject area 
of  the state law.73  The decision was controversial because it suggested the President could preempt 
66 See Bradley, supra note 50, at 308. Bradley argues that unilateral executive authority is in tension with the Article II 
process for making treaties, which requires the advice and consent of  two-thirds of  the Senate. Until Garamendi, courts 
rationalized that tension by linking the agreements to specific statutory schema rather than general policy. (“The sole 
executive agreement power must be significantly narrower than the power to enter into Article II treaties.”).
67 See Pink, 315 U.S. at 233 (“We repeat that there are limitations on the sovereignty of  the States. No State can rewrite 
our foreign policy to conform to its own domestic policies. Power over external affairs is not shared by the States; it is 
vested in the national government exclusively.”). For a detailed history of  other supporting cases, see generally Tikriti, supra 
note 4.
68 See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 710, n.2, (citing Curtiss-Wright). Several commentators argue that because executive 
agreements are not approved by Congress, they fall into a lower category of  Presidential power under Justice Jackson’s 
Youngstown framework. See Bradley, supra note 50 at 323. For purposes of  this article, Bradley’s point is moot – the 
Court affirmed that the President has authority to sign agreements sans congressional action, which had led to extensive 
discussion in Holocaust context.
69 See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 680 (1981). The key for the Court in Dames & Moore was that Congress 
had acted on a similar issue and had acquiesced in face of  Presidential assertion of  power in the realm of  foreign affairs 
(“Crucial to our decision today is the conclusion that Congress has implicitly approved the practice of  claim settlement 
by executive agreement.”). The Court relied most heavily on Pink, 315 U.S. at 203 and passage of  the International 
Claims Settlement Act of  1949. Dames, 315 U.S. at 680.
70 See, e.g., Pink 315 U.S. at 233, Belmont 301 U.S. at 326, and, according to the Majority in Dames & Moore, numerous 
other cases. See Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 682 (“In addition to congressional acquiescence in the President’s power 
to settle claims, prior cases of  this Court have also recognized that the President does have some measure of  power to 
enter into executive agreements without obtaining the advice and consent of  the Senate.”).
71 See Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 440-441 (1968) (even without a direct confrontation between federal and state 
law, such as a treaty, the state may not take action that could affect foreign relations); see also Reinstein, supra note 3, at 
332 (“The other reading of  Garamendi is that the California law was nullified because it interfered with the President’s 
ability to conduct foreign affairs as he saw fit…This reading of  the decision is based on Souter’s reliance on Zschernig v. 
Miller.”).
72 Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 432.
73 Id., cited in Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 398 (2003) (“In invalidating an Oregon statute, the Zschernig 
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state law merely based on the inference of  a federal policy, in violation of  the Supremacy Clause:74 
Zschernig provided the basis for a preemption test, which, perhaps because it was controversial, lay 
dormant, until Garamendi.75  
B. executive PreePtion Power: Garamendi
 The Garamendi decision fused the federal government’s power to sign executive agreements 
in the claims settlement context – affirmed in Dames & Moore, United States. v. Pink, and United 
States v. Belmont – with Zschernig’s principle of  preempting state law even where there is no explicit 
federal policy.76  Indeed, it remains unclear whether the Court invalidated California’s law because 
of  a longstanding Executive practice of  claims settlement, or, more controversially, because the law 
interfered with a “dormant” foreign affairs power.77  
 The Garamendi decision involved a California law intended to provide relief  to Holocaust-era 
insurance policyholders and their heirs.  The “Garamendi’ statute – named for the state’s insurance 
commissioner and lead defendant – specifically required any insurer doing business in the state to 
disclose information about Holocaust-era insurance policies that had been sold, by the insurer or 
“any related company,” to persons in Europe and that had been in effect between 1920 and 1945.78  
 Insurance companies sued on grounds that the statute intruded on the federal government’s 
exclusive authority in foreign affairs.79  They specifically argued that the federal government had 
majority relied on statements in previous cases that are open to the reading that state action with more than incidental 
effect on foreign affairs is preempted, even absent any affirmative federal activity in the subject area of  the state law, and 
hence without any showing of  conflict.”).
74 See Reinstein, supra note 3, at 333 (“No one doubts that Congress, in exercising its legislative powers over foreign 
affairs, can create new legal obligations and preempt state laws that stand in the way of  its objectives. But unexercised 
congressional power does not create power in the President.”).
75 See Ramsey, supra note 28, at 33-34 (President Clinton could only request Virginia to grant a stay of  execution for a 
Paraguayan sentenced to death while his case was pending at the International Court of  Justice.).
76 Id. at 34 (“Prior to Garamendi . . . there was little textual or precedential support for executive preemption aside from 
executive agreements implicitly approved by Congress. Garamendi seemed to go much further . . .”).
77 Id. The Majority references the President’s policy of  negotiation and characterizes the agreements as mere 
“exemplars” of  that policy, which indicates that the court rendered its decision based on the President’s policy, not the 
agreements. See also Reinstein, supra note 3, at 332. Reinstein indicates that there are two ways to read the decision, “The 
first is that [Garamendi] is an extension of Dames & Moore…The other reading of  Garamendi is that the California law was 
nullified because it interfered with the President’s ability to conduct foreign affairs as he saw fit—that is, the President’s 
policy was to settle the claims through voluntary means and not through litigation.”.
78 See Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 410 (“HVIRA was meant to enhance enforcement of  both the unfair business practice 
provision (§790.15) and the provision for suit on the policies in question (§354.5) by “ensur[ing] that any involvement 
[that licensed California insurers] or their related companies may have had with insurance policies of  Holocaust victims 
are [sic] disclosed to the state.”).
79 Garamendi, 2002 U.S. Briefs 722, 17 (2003) (“The statute invades the foreign affairs power of  the federal 
government. The text and history of  the Constitution, as well as necessary concomitants of  national sovereignty, require 
that ‘the whole subject’ of  ‘relations’ with ‘foreign nations’ be entrusted exclusively to the federal government.”); see 
also Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 412 (“After this ultimatum, the petitioners here, several American and European insurance 
companies and the American Insurance Association (a national trade association), filed suit for injunctive relief  against 
respondent insurance commissioner of  California, challenging the constitutionality of  HVIRA.”).
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backed the prevailing international process for settling such claims80, and that even though the U.S. 
Government did not formally voice an opinion in the litigation, it clearly had a policy to settle rather 
than litigate claims. Various government officials also argued that enforcement of  the statute would 
undermine international agreements signed by the Executive branch to seek relief  for policyholders 
through voluntary processes, although the U.S. Government did not offer a formal statement of  
interest in the case.81  
 To the extent the agreements made clear that the Executive opted for a policy of  negotiation 
to address the highly difficult challenge of  compensating Holocaust-era policy holders, the Court 
concluded that the California law must step aside: “The basic fact is that California seeks to use an 
iron fist where the President has consistently chosen kid gloves.”82  
 The Court did so even though (1) the agreements in question said nothing about 
preemption; (2) the United States declined the opportunity to weigh in formally in the litigation 
(in contrast to subsequent lawsuits); and (3) the specific company involved – Generali – was not 
formally covered by the executive agreements.83  Nonetheless, the Majority concluded that the 
President’s foreign affairs authority preempted state law.84  
 To get there, the Majority revived the field preemption test in Zschernig and concluded that 
state action with more than incidental effect on foreign affairs is preempted.  The Majority first 
looked at whether the general subject area of  the statute falls within an area of  traditional state 
responsibility, and it concluded that it did not.  Once that analysis was complete, the court turned to 
the question whether the statute intruded on a power expressly or impliedly reserved to the federal 
government.85  The Court then distilled a federal policy from the agreements and from statements 
of  officials.86 
 The Majority dismissed concerns regarding the lack of  congressional approval of  the 
agreements by citing the principle that “the President possesses considerable independent 
constitutional authority to act on behalf  of  the United States on international issues, and conflict 
with the exercise of  that authority is a comparably good reason to find preemption of  state law.”87  It 
viewed congressional silence in the lens of  a ‘historical gloss” of  acquiescence.88  In a footnote, the 
80 Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 396. Such claims were settled via the International Commission on Holocaust Era Insurance 
Claims (ICHEIC).
81 Id. at 411. Deputy Secretary Eizenstat and Chairman Eagleburger expressed this view.
82 Id. at 427.
83 Id. at 396. The principal defendant, Generali Assoncioni, fell under the jurisdiction of  Italy, which had no executive 
agreement with the US. Subsequent decisions characterized the executive agreement referenced in Garamendi as an 
“exemplar” of  U.S. policy but not dispositive given the lack of  any executive agreement. It is possible that the Supreme 
Court simply overlooked this detail, or the lack of  an agreement specifically with Italy was inconsequential given the 
Court’s overall conclusion that a federal foreign policy preempts state law.
84 Id. at 401. (“The issue here is whether HVIRA interferes with the National Government’s conduct of  foreign 
relations. We hold that it does, with the consequence that the state statute is preempted.”).
85   Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 413 (the power to set foreign policy and make executive agreements).
86 Id. at 422 (“This position, of  which the agreements are exemplars, has also been consistently supported in the high 
levels of  the Executive Branch…”).
87 Id. at 424, n. 14.
88 Id. at 413 (“There is, of  course, no question that at some point an exercise of  state power that touches on foreign 
relations must yield to the National Government’s policy, given the “concern for uniformity” in this country’s dealings 
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Majority conceded that Congress had not acted, but it did not regard further congressional action 
as necessary given the extensive history of  congressional deference to the executive in the claims 
settlement arena.89  
 The dissent, led by Justice Ginsburg, objected to the decision on grounds that it upheld 
preemption based on sub-Cabinet officials’ statements and executive agreements that contain no 
preemption clauses.90  In summary, the Garamendi decision sowed much uncertainty regarding the 
scope of  executive authority.  It left open the possibility that the President could preempt state law – 
thereby engage in lawmaking – based merely on a statement of  policy, mostly because it was unclear 
on what basis the Majority actually made its decision.
 
c. caBining Garamendi: medellin and the limitations on executive lawmaking
 Five years later, in Medellin v. Texas, the Supreme Court narrowed the Garamendi decision 
to the context of  claims settlement, where there is an executive agreement.91  In Medellin, Texas 
intended to execute a Mexican national who alleged that the state failed to inform him of  his right 
to notify the Mexican Consulate of  his arrest under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.92   
President Bush subsequently issued a memorandum to the State of  Texas requiring that Texas 
reexamine Medellin’s sentence in light of  an International Court of  Justice (ICJ) decision on the 
matter.93  Texas resisted, resulting in a legal confrontation with the President before the Court.
 The United States made two arguments: first, the relevant treaties give the President the 
authority to implement the ICJ judgment and that Congress had acquiesced in the exercise of  that 
authority.94  This argument was premised on the notion that the President could effectively convert 
a non-self  executing treaty into a self-executing one based on the Supremacy, Treaty, and Take Care 
Clauses.95  As an alternative, the United States pointed to the President’s memorandum as a lawful 
exercise of  independent presidential power to enforce treaty obligations.96  
with foreign nations”); (“President possesses in his own right certain powers conferred . . . as the Nation’s organ in 
foreign affairs.”).
89 Id. at 424 n. 14.
90 Id. at 444 (“[N]o authoritative text accords such officials the power to invalidate state law simply by conveying 
the Executive’s views on matters of  federal policy. The displacement of  state law by preemption properly requires a 
considerably more formal and binding federal instrument.”).
91 See Tikriti, supra note 4, at 783, (citing Reinstein, supra note 3) (“In effect, Medellin narrowed the scope of  the 
Garamendi decision despite the fact that “Medellin was a much stronger case . . . for the invalidation of  a state law.”); 
Pytnia, supra note 4, at 1429 (“Four short years later, in Medellin the Supreme Court seemed to completely undermine 
its rationale in Garamendi.”); see also Reinstein, supra note 3, at 333 (“The Supreme Court recently adopted the narrower 
reading of  Garamendi [i]n Medellin v. Texas.”).
92 For extensive case history, see Tikriti, supra note 4, at 780.
93 Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), Judgment, I.C.J. 2004 17 (March 31).
94 Medellin v. Texas, 2006 U.S. Briefs 984, 10, n.2 (2007).
95 Medellin v. Texas, 2006 U.S. Briefs 984, 1 (Reply Brief  for Petitioner) (“[E]ven if  the obligation to comply were non-
self-executing, so that some further action were necessary to make it judicially enforceable, the President, who has 
authority under Article II to ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,’ has taken it.”).
96 For a thorough discussion of  self-executing treaties and the Medellin decision, see Curtis A. Bradley, Medellin: Intent, 
Presumptions, and Non-Self-Executing Treaties, 102 am. J. int’l l. 540, 547-550 (2008).
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 In relying on the memorandum, the President’s legal team explicitly asserted two strands 
of  the Garamendi decision.97  First, they made a Zschernig-like argument– the President could 
impose a non self-executing treaty on the states based on the inherent authority of  the Executive. 
Second, the United States explicitly made a claims settlement argument, namely that the President’s 
Memorandum constituted a valid exercise of  the President’s foreign affairs authority to resolve 
claims disputes with foreign nations.98  To the extent there was a conflict between Mexico and the 
United States regarding interpretation of  the Vienna Convention, the President had wide berth 
to settle that claim, even if  it required preemption of  state law.99  To support this view, the United 
States highlighted the President’s unique role in foreign affairs and characterized the memorandum 
as an exercise of  that authority. For example:
                                                     100
                                                                                                  101
                                                               102
                                                                                                                        103
 Just as the Executive argued in Garamendi that state law should step aside if  it intrudes on the 
President’s foreign affairs power, the President’s team in Medellin argued that the President’s decision-
97 Medellin, 2006 U.S. Briefs 984, 5 (2007). The government cited Garamendi and Dames and Moore for the proposition 
that “…the President has recognized authority to resolve disputes with foreign nations over individual claims, and to 
establish binding rules of  decision that preempt contrary state law.”.
98 Medellin, 552 U.S. at 530. The United States relied on cases where the Court has upheld executive actions in the face 
of  congressional acquiescence.
99 Medellin, 2006 U.S. Briefs 984, 5 (2007) (“[T]he President has recognized authority to resolve disputes with foreign 
nations over individuals claims, and to establish binding rules of  decision that preempt contrary state law. See, e.g., 
American Ins. Assoc. v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003)”).
100 Id.
101 Brief  for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, at 4, Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008).
102 Id. at 9.
103 Id. at 12.
• “The President is constitutionally charged with making and is uniquely 
qualified to make the prompt and sensitive determinations involved [in 
foreign affairs].” 
• “Because the President was unquestionably in the best position to 
weigh the strength of  those competing considerations, and to balance 
them in light of  global foreign policy concerns, the applicable treaties 
are logically understood as delegating to the President the authority to 
strike the appropriate balance for the nation.”  
• “The President’s determination that state courts give effect to the Avena 
decision…reflects the President’s considered judgment that the United 
States’ foreign policy interests in meeting its international obligations 
and protecting Americans abroad require the United States to comply 
with the ICJ’s decision.  
• “The President was best positioned to balance the harm from 
complying with a decision with which he disagreed against the adverse 
consequences to the conduct of  foreign affairs and to American 
citizens abroad that would attend defiance of  the decision.”
52 NATIONAL SECURITY LAW BRIEF Vol. 5, No. 1
making power in foreign affairs should preempt state criminal statutes that frustrate Presidential 
policy in foreign affairs.  This was no theoretical battle – the President issued the Memorandum 
precisely because he believed Texas was frustrating his implementation of  foreign policy.
 The Majority rejected these arguments. The Court first concluded that the Avena judgment 
was not enforceable as domestic law in state court because the relevant treaty sources – the Optional 
Protocol, the U.N. Charter, or the ICJ Statute -- were not self-executing and Congress had taken 
no action to implement them.104  The court observed that although a treaty may constitute an 
international legal obligation on the part of  the United States, the Constitution required Congress to 
act to impose the treaties on the states. Because there was no implementing legislation, there was no 
State requirement.105  
 Assessing the claims settlement argument, the Majority rejected the President’s Garamendi-
based arguments that the memorandum was implicitly authorized by the Optional Protocol and that 
it constituted a valid exercise of  the President’s foreign affairs authority to resolve claims disputes.106  
The court observed that the power to make law rests in the Congress, and that by definition the 
President lacks authority to give unilateral domestic effect to a non-self  executing treaty (“A non-self  
executing treaty, by definition, is one that was ratified with the understanding that it is not to have 
domestic effect of  its own force.”).107  
 The Court also made clear that it did not view a sufficient nexus between the President’s 
dispute with Mexico and the Executive’s claims settlement authority: “[t]he President’s Memorandum 
is not supported by a ‘particularly longstanding practice’ of  congressional acquiescence, but rather is 
what the United States itself  has described as ‘unprecedented action.108 
 Citing Dames & Moore, the court pointed out that “[p]ast practice does not, by itself, create 
power,” and that the President’s Memorandum was not supported by any history of  congressional 
acquiescence given its unprecedented nature. The claims settlement authority could allow for 
preemption of  state law, but not for reaching “deep into the heart of  the State’s police powers and 
compel[ ] state courts to reopen final criminal judgments and set aside neutrally applicable state 
laws.”109  
104 See Medellin, 552 U.S. at 506 (“Because none of  these treaty sources creates binding federal law in the absence 
of  implementing legislation, and because it is uncontested that no such legislation exists, we conclude that the Avena 
judgment [which the President sought to enforce through a Memorandum] is not automatically binding domestic law.”).
105 The Dissent argued that no further congressional action was needed, since accession to the relevant treaties 
constituted sufficient congressional action. See Medellin 552 U.S., at 538-539 (“The United States has signed and ratified 
a series of  treaties obliging it to comply with ICJ judgments in cases in which it has given its consent to the exercise of  
the ICJ’s adjudicatory authority. . . . Under these circumstances, I believe the treaty obligations, and hence the judgment, 
resting as it does upon the consent of  the United States to the ICJ’s jurisdiction, bind the courts no less than would ‘an 
act of  the [federal] legislature.’”).
106 Id. at 531 (“[W]e find that our claims-settlements cases do not support the authority that the President asserts in 
this case.”).
107 Id. at 527 (citing Hamdan, 548 U.S. 557).
108 Id. at 532.
109 Id. 
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d. reconciling Garamendi and medellin: the interim detainee cases.
 Whereas the Majority in Garamendi sought no express role for Congress when approving 
Executive preemption of  state law, the Majority in Medellin made Congressional action a prerequisite 
to approve preemption.  The decision also deviated from the Court’s continuing diminishment of  
congressional authority in the domestic context.110  Why in the Garamendi case did the Majority defer 
to the “independent constitutional authority” of  the President to preempt state law based on foreign 
affairs concerns, and then expressly reject that power in the Medellin case? 
 The simplest answer is that the Majority perceived federal preemption of  criminal law as a 
different, more intrusive action than preemption of  the Garamendi statute, one with a vague nexus 
to a state’s insurance regulatory responsibility.111  Further, the nexus between the US-Mexico dispute 
and the constitutional question in Medellin was weak, and reliance on a memorandum to preempt 
state law had no precedent, even by the President’s admission.112  
 However, there were broader forces as well.  My key contention is that the decision 
paralleled – and was likely influenced by – the court’s conclusions in the detainee context, namely 
that assertions of  executive lawmaking power will be invalidated during periods of  national security 
crisis absent involvement from the legislature.113  Whereas in Garamendi the court was willing to 
stomach congressional silence, by the time Medellin was decided, it insisted on a more involved role 
for Congress given the detainee litigation over the previous four years. 
 This explanation is based on a “middle ground” theory articulated by Professor Trevor 
Morrison. According to Morrison, during war and periods of  national security crisis, courts will 
resist both executive unilateralism and civil libertarian maximalism, in favor of  encouraging joint 
cooperative action between the legislative and executive branches, particularly with regard to exercise 
of  war powers and other shared responsibilities.114  Instead of  deferring to unilateral assertions of  
110 Critics point out that Medellin was an unexpected result for a conservative Court given that the Court had been 
continuing a trajectory of  diminishing congressional authority in the domestic context. The Medellin decision followed 
on the heels of  a series of  cases striking down legislation related to the Commerce Power, near unprecedented in the 
previous century. If  the Court were rolling back congressional authority in an area dead center in its constitutional 
mandate, a fortiori one might expect the court to exercise deference to the Executive in a contested sphere of  foreign 
affairs. See generally Irwin Chermerinsky, The Assumptions of  Federalism, 58 Stan. l. rev. 1763 (2006).
111 Medellin, 552 U.S. at 532. The Majority focused on the unprecedented nature of  the federal government overriding 
state police powers via presidential directive (“Indeed, the Government has not identified a single instance in which the 
President has attempted (or Congress has acquiesced in) a Presidential directive issued to state courts, much less one that 
reaches deep into the heart of  the State’s police powers and compels state courts to reopen final criminal judgments and 
set aside neutrally applicable state laws.”).
112 Id. (“The President’s Memorandum is not supported by a ‘particularly longstanding practice’ of  congressional 
acquiescence, see Garamendi, . . . but rather is what the United States itself  has described as ‘unprecedented action[.]’”).
113 See Morrison, supra note 40, at 454. (“[P]rivileging the joint action of  the political branches means being 
more prepared to uphold the executive’s assertion of  detention authority when the executive can point to legislative 
authorization for its actions.”).
114 See Morrison, supra note 34, at 1703. Morrison applies the framework articulated by Professor Issacharoff  and 
Pildes to the war on terror detention cases. See Samuel Issacharoff  & Richard Pildes, Between Civil Libertarianism and 
Executive Unilateralism: An Institutional Process Approach to Rights During Wartime, 5 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 1 (2004) 
(articulating the basic theory that, in times of  national security crisis, courts encourage joint cooperative action between 
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Executive authority or striking down sweeping government actions on civil libertarian grounds, the 
Court “has favored a middle path focused on “whether the executive has involved the legislature in 
the equation, and…whether the executive has remained within the bounds of  the power granted it 
by the legislature.”115  
 According to Morrison, the Court will resist deferring to the Executive Branch if  it 
believes the Executive has failed to adequately involve Congress and has deviated from the “core 
characteristics” of  a “three-branch constitutional structure.”116  
 Morrison observes that the detainee decisions between 2004 and 2008 correspond to the 
court’s historical reluctance to support unilateral assertions of  executive power during wartime.117  
In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U. S. 507 (2004), the Court accepted the President’s contention that 
detention of  individuals who fought against the U.S. in Afghanistan is an “exercise of  the ‘necessary 
and appropriate force’” pursuant to the AUMF, but it rejected the President’s argument that the 
Executive could eliminate the role of  the Judicial branch and insisted on cooperation among the 
branches: “[w]hatever power the United States Constitution envisions for the Executive in its 
exchanges with other nations or with enemy organizations in times of  conflict, it most assuredly 
envisions a role for all three branches when individual liberties are at stake.”118  
 In Rasul v. Bush, 542 U. S. 466, 473 (2004), the court rejected the President’s argument that 
Guantanamo Bay is outside the jurisdiction of  the US, and it concluded that statutory habeas 
jurisdiction extends to the prison there.  In the case decided before Medellin -- Hamdan v. Rumsfeld -- 
the court rejected the President’s argument that he has the authority to expand military commissions 
to try and punish captured enemy combatants outside of  the laws of  war in the absence of  any 
statutory authorization.119  Finally, in Boumediene v. Bush – decided immediately after the Medellin 
decision – the Majority put a stake in efforts to strip detainees of  habeas rights and remove the court 
from the determination of  applicability of  the constitution.120  
 These cases highlight that the court will not just “privilege” cooperation during periods of  
the legislative and executive branches).
115 Id.
116 Id. (“The leading judicial articulation of  this approach is Justice Jackson’s concurring opinion in Youngstown Sheet & 
Tube Co. v. Sawyer. His familiar three-tiered framework provides that the President’s authority is at its ‘maximum’ when 
he acts with implied or express congressional authorization, at its ‘lowest ebb’ when he acts contrary to congressional 
prohibition, and in a ‘zone of  twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its 
distribution is uncertain’ when Congress has neither authorized nor prohibited the action”).
117 Id. at 1704 (“Precedents [like Youngstown] do not guarantee the Court will reject all presidential ‘power grabs’ that 
exceed legislative limits, but they do give the Court a robust basis for resisting.”).
118 Hamdi, 542 U.S. 507, cited in Morrison, supra note 40, at 456-460 (“Hamdi and Hamdan both reveal that in war-on-
terror cases pitting executive power against individual liberty, the Court has looked in particular to Congress. When the 
executive’s actions seem to the Court to fall within the scope of  authority conferred by Congress, as in Hamdi, the Court 
has been inclined to sustain the actions; when the executive acts alone, as in Hamdan, the Court has been less inclined to 
defer.”); see also Morrison, supra note 34, at 1699-1700.
119 See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 595-596 (“Absent a more specific congressional authorization, the task of  this Court is, 
as it was in Quirin, to decide whether Hamdan’s military commission is so justified.”). The court refused to address the 
President’s assertion that he has the “inherent authority” to convene military commissions.
120 See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. at 727, cited in syllabus at 3 (“To hold that the political branches may switch the 
Constitution on or off  at will would lead to a regime in which they, not this Court, say ‘what the law is.’”).
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national security crises, but insist on it.121  The court will be more resistant to inferring congressional 
approval, and, according to Morrison’s theory, less inclined to defer to the Executive during wartime, 
when the President “acts alone.”122  Medellin, decided in the midst of  the detainee decisions, could 
have been influenced by the court’s hesitation to accommodate “unprecedented” assertions of  
presidential power without an express role of  Congress.123  Hamdan, described below, provides the 
key evidentiary link. 
e. aPPlying Hamdan to medellin
 Applying Morrison’s theory to Medellin, one may argue that the Court in that case was 
unsettled with the President’s unilateral effort to enforce a self-executing treaty based on a 
memorandum.  The Court looked to Congress to see if  it had ratified the Executive action in a way 
it had not prior to the detainee cases, because it had not yet fully grappled with the President’s broad 
assertions of  lawmaking authority.  Where Congress had not authorized the President’s actions, 
the court followed its pattern in the detainee cases and rejected unilateral claims of  Executive 
authority.124  
 Hamdan for our purposes is particularly important, because it was very much on mind of  the 
Court in Medellin. To establish the principle the executive is the implementer of  law, not maker of  
law, the Majority in Medellin cited Hamdan: [T]he power to make the necessary laws is in Congress; 
the power to execute in the President.”).125  Likewise, the court embraced the argument made by the 
Solicitor General of  Texas, who specifically referenced Hamdan in oral argument: “I think a powerful 
parallel is the decision of  this Court last year in Hamdan.  In Hamdan the President was at the height 
of  his war powers authority.  And nonetheless, this Court concluded that he could not act contrary 
to the will of  Congress.”126  
 In both Hamdan and Medellin, the United States argued that no role for Congress was 
necessary.  In Hamdan, the Government argued that the President has “inherent authority to 
convene military commissions”127  based on the President’s authority as Commander-in-Chief128 and 
the President’s war powers under Article II, Section 2.129  Without explicitly rejecting the President’s 
121 See Morrison, supra note 34, at 1704.
122 See Morrison, supra note 40, at 460.
123 Id.
124 See Morrison, supra note 34, at 1705 for specific application of  Youngstown to Medellin.
125 See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 592 (referring to question whether the President has inherent authority to convene military 
commissions “without the sanction of  Congress,”).
126 Transcript of  Oral Argument at 65-66, Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008) (No. 06-984), available at http://
www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/06-984.pdf.
127 See Brief  for Respondents at 8, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, (2006) (No. 05-184), 2006 WL 460875 (“Even 
if  Congress’s support for the President’s Military Order were not so clear, the President has the inherent authority to 
convene military commissions to try and punish captured enemy combatants in wartime--even in the absence of  any 
statutory authorization.”).
128 Id. at 20 (“the first of  the enumerated powers of  the President is that he shall be Commander-in-Chief  of  the 
Army and Navy of  the United States.”).
129 Id. (“The President’s war power under Article II, Section 2, of  the Constitution includes the inherent authority to 
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argument regarding inherent authority, the court in Hamdan concluded that “he may not disregard 
limitations that Congress has, in proper exercise of  its own powers, placed on his powers.”130  The 
Court required congressional authorization for the President to authorize charges such as conspiracy 
outside of  the laws of  war.131 
 Likewise, in Medellin, the President asserted unilateral authority -- based on Garamendi – to 
preempt state law.  The United States’ brief  before the Court advanced strong unilateral assertions 
of  executive power.  For example, the United States argued that “[t]he President has authority 
to establish binding rules of  decision that preempt contrary state law”132 and “[t]he President’s 
memorandum is sufficient to create a binding legal rule.”133  
 The Court viewed Medellin in the same context as Hamdan – it wanted to see active 
congressional assent to the imposition of  a non-self-executing treaty on the states, particularly 
during a period of  war, and it wanted to blunt the role of  the President as lawmaker.134  As Morrison 
observes, “in refusing to defer to the presidential memorandum, the Court reemphasized the 
centrality of  historical practice in its analysis.  In that respect, Medellin is a reaffirmation of  a doctrine 
that resists unprecedented assertions of  executive power.”135 
 Perhaps the result would have been different had the United States signed an executive 
agreement with Mexico, which would have strengthened the ‘historical gloss’ argument.  But because 
Medellin was decided at the exact moment the court was at its apex in looking for cooperation among 
the political branches, the President’s unilateral assertions of  executive authority rang hollow before 
the court. 
 A reappraisal of  executive lawmaking power in light of  Morrison’s theory accounts for the 
different result in Medellin and Garamendi.  The Court sought legislative participation in Medellin, 
whereas in Garamendi – decided before the major detention cases -- it was prepared to countenance 
a more unilateral approach.  According to one expert, the Court’s reading of Garamendi in Medellin 
“indicates that it had come to appreciate the fundamental threat to constitutional structure posed 
by a broad reading of  Garamendi that gave preemptive effect to mere presidential policy.”136  With 
the pattern of  detainee cases established following Garamendi, the Court in Medellin resisted an 
unprecedented assertion of  power.  It also tightened application of  the ‘historical gloss’ argument to 
create military commissions even in the absence of  any statutory authorization, because that authority is a necessary and 
longstanding component of  his war powers.”).
130 Hamdan, 548 U.S.at 593.
131 Id. 
132 Presidential Power and Federalism, a Panel Discussion, 6 geo. J.l. & PuB. Pol’y 160, 173 (2008) (comments of  Michael 
Ramsey) (discussing Brief  for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 5, Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 
491, No. 06-984, (2007) WL 1909462) (“On page five, it is asserted that the President has the authority to establish 
binding rules of  decision--this is a quote: ‘The President has authority to establish binding rules of  decision that 
preempt contrary state law.’ On page six, ‘The President’s memorandum is sufficient to create a binding legal rule.’ On 
page eighteen, ‘The Executive Branch is supplying the rule of  decision in litigation implicating sensitive foreign policy.’”).
133 Id. at 173.
134 See id. (“[W]hat is happening here is the President is making law; that is, the President seeks, by his own authority, 
to take something that is not federal law and to make it federal law and thereby displace inconsistent state law.”).
135 Morrison, supra note 34, at 1706.
136 Ramsey, supra note 28, at 36.
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justify unilateral executive action.  After Medellin, courts may seek more than Congressional silence to 
affirm a “historical gloss.” 
Part ii: congressional silence and Garamendi
 The Garamendi opinion raises two other related but distinct issues, which I will address 
in parts II and III of  this article.  First, the Garamendi majority’s interpretation of  congressional 
silence as assent raises questions regarding how to interpret legislative inaction.  At a minimum, it 
constitutes a problematic view of  the legislative process.  Second, the decision left unclear how to 
formalize executive policy, which, in turn, leaves ambiguous the standards upon which to measure 
whether a state law intrudes on the President’s foreign affairs authority to resolve claims. 
a. Garamendi and the court’s view oF acQuiescence
 A key factor for the Court’s approval of  the President’s preemption of  state law in 
Garamendi was the ‘historical gloss’ of  congressional acquiescence to claims settlement. The Court 
concluded that unexercised congressional authority gives the president power to preempt state law: 
“[i]n sum, Congress has not acted on the matter addressed here. Given the President’s independent 
authority in the areas of  foreign policy and national security, . . . congressional silence is not to be 
equated with congressional disapproval.”137 
 The Court relied extensively on Dames & Moore, which gave wide berth to executive based 
on character and acquiescence of  legislation:
 
                                                                                                                     138
 This approach places less emphasis on the political dynamics of  Congress and more on what 
Congress actually produces in the foreign policy area; it is a flawed approach.  Congress is silent in 
the foreign affairs arena for any number of  reasons.  According to Koh, Congress is often silent 
on the President’s actions in foreign affairs because of  “legislative myopia, inadequate drafting, 
137 See Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 414, 429 (stating that the President has independent constitutional authority to act in 
some areas without need of  congressional action); see also Denning, supra note 7, at 886 (“Employing scanty analysis, the 
Court found neither statute material to its resolution.”).
138 Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 678; see also Bradley, supra note 4, at 1103-1109 (providing an historical overview of  
judicial reliance on a doctrine of  the historical gloss on executive power); koh, supra note 3, at 117 (citing multiple 
reasons for congressional failure to oppose the actions of  the Executive in the arena of  foreign policy).
We cannot ignore the general tenor of  Congress’ legislation in this area 
in trying to determine whether the President is acting alone or at least 
with the acceptance of  Congress. As we have noted, Congress cannot 
anticipate and legislate with regard to every possible action the President 
may find it necessary to take or every possible situation in which he might 
act. Such failure of  Congress specifically to delegate authority does not, 
“especially…in the areas of  foreign policy and national security,” imply 
“congressional disapproval” of  action taken by the Executive. 
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ineffective legislative tools, or sheer lack of  political will.”139  Unexercised congressional power 
should not create power in the President or be interpreted as acquiescence, according to Koh.140  
 In more positive terms, Congressional silence is a political prerogative of  the legislative 
branch.  Congress often will not speak on issues of  great controversy or that are not yet resolved in 
courts, particularly when there is minimal political benefit in doing so or ambiguous constitutional 
authority to act.  This is particularly true in the foreign affairs realm, where there is often little 
political benefit and high cost for Congress to act.  For example, Congress frequently fails to pass a 
Foreign Relations Authorization bill as a result of  budgetary and political sensitivities regarding the 
State Department’s budget, and it has not passed a foreign assistance authorization bill since 1985. 
Congressional inaction should not be viewed here as acquiescence, but rather quite the opposite 
– the issues involved in the legislation are sufficiently complex to render Congress silent in the 
matter.141   
 Empirically, the Garamendi court’s analysis of  congressional acquiescence in Dames & 
Moore was simply wrong.  The Court reasoned that there is a ‘historical gloss’ of  congressional 
acquiescence to private claims adjudicated by the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission.  Yet more 
than half  of  cases addressed by claims settlement commission stem from legislation, not Executive 
referral.  The Commission has completed seven programs pursuant to executive agreement between 
the U.S. and a foreign government and fourteen claims programs pursuant to specific legislation.142  
139 See koh, supra note 3, at 117, 139. Koh criticizes the Court’s reliance in Dames & Moore on a “disturbing three-part 
technique of  statutory construction,” the heart of  which is a flawed reading of  congressional acquiescence. According 
to Koh, the three flaws of  Rehnquist’s opinion in Dames & Moore are as follows: first, Justice Rehnquist did not demand 
a “clear statement” that Congress had authorized the president to suspend individual claims, “despite the undeniable 
impact of  the president’s act on individual rights.” This mistake is all the more glaring, according to Koh, given that 
Congress had legislated in the claims settlement context. Second, the Court interpreted IEEPA as unambiguously 
authorizing the Executive’s proposed action, notwithstanding legislative history to the contrary. Third, rather than 
interpreting congressional silence on the suspension of  claims as a check on the President’s power to unilaterally act, 
Rehnquist reconfigured congressional silence as acquiescence.
140 See id. at 140 (“Dames & Moore also sent the president the wrong message. In responding to perceived national 
crises, the Court suggested, the president should act first, then search for preexisting congressional blank checks, rather 
than seek specific prior or immediate subsequent approval of  controversial decisions.”); see also Reinstein, supra note 
3, at 333 (“unexercised congressional power does not create power in the President.”). Koh’s critique highlights that 
judicial inference of  congressional silence is not a new issue. This dynamic is present even in the Steel Seizure cases of  
Youngstown, in which the Court inferred from Congressional omission of  proposals to amend the Labor Act to include 
seizure remedies that Congress opposed such remedies.
141 Regrettably, Congressional silence or, at times, dysfunction, has been used by the Executive Branch as an excuse 
to press forward with policies ultimately inconsistent with a separation of  powers framework. For example, Oliver 
North justified funding the Contras on grounds that Congress simply was too dysfunctional to pass a budget bill 
to proceed with funding for the Contras. Colonel North overlooked the fact that in that instance (a) Congress had 
spoken unambiguously on the issue; and (b) Congressional “paralysis” actually reflected deep ambivalence on policy 
matters. See National Security Council Memorandum from Oliver L. North to Robert C. McFarlane, “Fallback Plan for 
the Nicaraguan Resistance,” TOP SECRET, March 16, 1985, available at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/
NSAEBB210/4-North%20Fallback%20memo%203-16-85%20%28IC%2000952%29.pdf.
142 See Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, 2011 annual rePort section V, available at http://www.justice.gov/
fcsc/annrep11.pdf. The Commission has jurisdiction to administer programs under Title I of  the International Claims 
Settlement Act, 22 U.S.C. 1623(a)(1)(B) for claims arising out of  nationalization or other taking of  property that are 
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In “converting legislative silence into consent,” the Majority misconstrued congressional silence as 
acquiescence.
 In the claims context, congressional silence tells us little about the intended preemptive 
effects of  agreements or policies or overall congressional intent.143  Regarding Holocaust insurance, 
Congress held two oversight hearings before 2003.  Because the international claims commission 
to settle Holocaust-era insurance claims was just starting its work, few Members had defined views 
on the issues.  Congressional “silence” was likely the result of  unfamiliarity with the insurance issue 
and uncertainty regarding how to handle the insurance claims of  Holocaust-era policy holders, not 
acquiescence to the Administration’s policy. 
 In fact, extensive congressional debate post Garamendi reveals a highly divided Congress. 
Insurance policy holders sought legislation to overturn the Garamendi decision and sue European 
insurance companies.  On one side were survivors who sought legislation to authorize a cause 
of  action.  On the other side were Jewish groups concerned about the impact of  the legislation 
on ongoing reparations and who questioned the premise of  unpaid policies.  The House Foreign 
Affairs and Financial Services Committees held hearings on the bill in 2008 and marked up 
conflicting texts.  The bill stalled again in the 111th Congress and, despite a markup in the House 
Foreign Affairs Committee, never reached the House floor in the 112th.  Far from acquiescing to the 
Administration’s policies, Members sought to avoid a highly controversial issue that split the Jewish 
community and, in practical terms, attracted protesters at fundraising events and congressional 
functions.  House Members were particularly sensitive to the possibility of  a fight among Jewish 
organizations that would manifest itself  on the House floor.  Given conflicting congressional action 
following Garamendi, the notion that Congress ‘never questioned’ the Executive action or wholly 
supported the Executive practice, is misplaced. 
 The result of  the Court’s reliance on congressional “silence” in Garamendi was that Congress 
ended up the loser in the decision.144  The Court took a different approach in Hamdan. It conducted 
a close reading of  the Detainee Treatment Act and concluded that congressional silence regarding 
the Administration’s proposed amendment to the UCMJ generated a negative inference:
  
included within the terms of  a claims agreement (executive agreement) between the U.S. and a foreign government.
143 See Denning, supra note 7, at 889 (highlighting the level of  activity and prior knowledge Congress held before the 
passage of  the Holocaust Commission Act, but was unaware of  the full extent of  the plans of  the Executive regarding 
the same issue the law was passed to address).
144 See id. at 905 (“The President’s ability to pursue a unilateral foreign policy agenda is enhanced and Congress’ role 
in deciding foreign policy priorities is diminished by the constitutional innovation of  executive preemption”.); see also 
Oona A. Hathaway, Presidential Power over International Law: Restoring the Balance, 119 yale l.J. 140, 147 (2009) (“Effective 
international lawmaking requires not just an unfettered negotiator but also widespread political support for the deal the 
negotiator strikes. When an agreement is concluded behind closed doors, with little or no input from Congress or the 
public at large, it can be difficult to build political support for the agreement that results.”).
A familiar principle of  statutory construction, relevant both in Lindh 
and here, is that a negative inference may be drawn from the exclusion 
of  language from one statutory provision that is included in other 
provisions of  the same statute. …(“’[W]here Congress includes particular 
language in one section of  a statute but omits it in another section of  the 
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 The Court went so far as to characterize the Government’s explanations of  congressional 
inaction on the proposed amendment as “straining credulity”.  It analyzed congressional 
consideration of  the reaches of  the proposed amendments and determined that Congress’ rejection 
of  “the very language that would have achieved the result the Government urges” undermined the 
Government’s rationale. In short, it read congressional silence as rejection, not as approval, of  the 
President’s approach. 
 The Court in Medellin narrowed Garamendi’s extension of  Dames & Moore, a decision which, 
according to Harold Koh, “championed unguided executive activism and congressional acquiescence 
in foreign affairs over the constitutional principle of  balanced institutional participation.”146  
 Given the court’s interest in Medellin to ensure cooperation among the political branches, the 
Majority may have been unwilling to view congressional silence regarding the memorandum or the 
specific treaties in question as acquiescence. 
iii. standards For imPlementing the Foreign aFFairs PreemPtion Doctrine
 A final criticism of  Garamendi rests in its unclear approach towards preemption.  Specifically, 
the Court in Garamendi left little clarity regarding what exactly constitutes an “express executive 
branch policy,” and it did not articulate a clear standard for foreign affairs preemption.147  As a result, 
courts have applied the conflict preemption test unevenly since Garamendi.148  This corresponds to a 
pattern of  ill-defined preemption tests proffered by the Court.149   
 The Majority’s decision in Garamendi was premised on a conflict preemption test revived 
from Zschernig, which requires a state law to “yield when it conflicts with an express federal foreign 
145 Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 578.
146 koh, supra note 3, at 140.
147 See Pytnia, supra note 4, at 1429 (“The court failed to clarify the scope of  the dormant foreign affairs preemption 
doctrine, and it relied on a fact-specific balancing test rather than articulating a clear standard for foreign affairs 
preemption cases.”); see also Buys, supra note 7, at 207 (“While the Ninth Circuit corrected this problem upon rehearing, 
there still exists much uncertainty as to what actions by the federal government are sufficient to preempt state law and 
what room, if  any, is left for states to act, and especially to express opinions on U.S. foreign policy issues.”).
148 See Petition for Writ of  Certiorari, Arzoumanian, supra note 44, at 17 (“[the Movsesian decision] presents this 
Court with a perfect vehicle to clarify the foreign affairs preemption doctrine.”). The petition highlights that the status 
of  the foreign affairs doctrine remains unsettled after Garamendi. Courts interpret it differently, with some explicitly 
rejecting Medellin’s core rationale that foreign policy preemption applies where there is an executive agreement. Likewise, 
petitioner’s writ of  certiorari in Garamendi flags uneven application of Medellin’s requirement for an executive agreement. 
See, e.g., Central Valley Chrysler-Jeep v. Witherspoon, 456 F.Supp.2d 1160, 1179 (E.D. Cal 2006) (“[i]f  the Executive 
Branch statements are competent evidence of  what our foreign policy is, the court sees no reason to limit preemption to 
foreign policy as expressed in statutes or executive agreements”); Whiteman v. Dorotheum GmbH & Co. KG, 431 F.3d 
57, 72-73 (2d Cir. 2005); Ibrahim v. Titan Corp., 391 F.Supp.2d 10, 16 (D.D.C. 2005).
149 See Goldsmith, supra at note 43, at 3 (“[t]he Supreme Court’s preemption jurisprudence is famous for its 
incoherence. The doctrines of  preemption are vague and indeterminate. Their relations to one another are unclear. And 
their decisional outcomes are difficult to cohere.”).
same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and 
purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion’”).  
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policy.”150  The Court relied on an intricate multi-step test to determine whether a state law conflicts 
with federal policy, and the policy may be manifest through “a treaty, federal statute, or express 
executive branch policy.”151  
 The Majority in Garamendi concluded there is a federal policy based on statements from 
Deputy Secretary of  the Treasury Stuart Eizenstat, along with signings of  executive agreements 
on Holocaust compensation.152  Justice Ginsburg in her dissent argued the Majority was too quick 
to find an executive policy based on the statements of  lower-level officials, and she lamented the 
Majority’s refusal to conduct a textual analysis of  the executive agreements at hand, all of  which 
were devoid of  a preemption clause.153  
 Medellin likewise did not articulate a standard to formalize an Executive policy, nor did 
it need to, since the memorandum in Medellin made the President’s policies quite explicit.  The 
Majority simply limited Garamendi and the exercise of  the President’s preemption authority to claims 
settlement cases, where there is an executive agreement.154  The decision implies that an executive 
agreement is a prerequisite for purposes of  preemption, but given its limited purpose in invalidating 
the President’s reliance on his foreign affairs authority, the court did not elaborate on the specific 
test for preemption. 
 The result of  silence regarding what actually constitutes a “federal policy” is uncertain 
implementation of  the Garamendi and Medellin decisions.  The 2nd Circuit, for example, relegated 
Medellin to a footnote in upholding a district court decision preempting litigation against Generali 
where no executive agreement exists.155   The Court – noting that Italy had not signed an executive 
agreement with the United States in the case at hand -- characterized the executive agreements as 
a “product” of  the federal policy, not as the definition of  it.156  Nonetheless, to “erase any doubt” 
150 Movsesian II, supra note 44.
151 American International Law Cases 1961 (4th Ser., Oceana 2009); see also Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of  
Art at Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954, 960 (9th Cir. 2010) (explaining that under field preemption, a state law may be preempted 
if  it intrudes on the Executive’s foreign affairs power without addressing a traditional state responsibility); Movsesian, 670 
F.3d at 1072 (“The existence of  this general foreign affairs power implies that, even when the federal government has 
taken no action on a particular foreign policy issue, the state generally is not free to make its own foreign policy on that 
subject.”).
152 Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 422-23.
153 See id. at 441-42.
154 See Medellin 552 U.S. at 531. (As discussed in part II, the Majority concluded that the preemption authority affirmed 
in Garamendi is limited to “narrow set of  circumstances,” where there is an executive agreement to settle civil claims 
between American citizens and foreign governments or foreign nationals, and where Congress has never questioned the 
executive exercise of  authority.).
155 See Weiss v. Assicurazioni Generali, 592 F.3d 113, 119 (2nd Cir. 2010) (holding that a foreign affairs policy – even 
without an executive agreement – is sufficient to preempt a lawsuit against an insurance company, and it dismissed 
Medellin’s language in a mere footnote (“We find nothing inconsistent . . . in the reference in Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 
. . . to ‘cases in which [the Supreme Court] has upheld the authority of  the President to settle foreign claims pursuant 
to an executive agreement.’”). The 2nd Circuit observed that executive agreements were merely exemplars– but not 
dispositive – of  a federal policy according to the Court in Garamendi).
156 See Generali, at 118 (“Rather, the Court viewed the executive agreements as the product of  the policy. The 
agreements, and statements of  interest issued by the Government pursuant to them, illustrate or express the national 
position, rather than define it.”).
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regarding executive policy given uncertainty regarding the executive agreements, the court solicited a 
statement from the Secretary of  State on the foreign policy of  the United States: “The Government 
has twice made perfectly clear that ‘[i]t has been and continues to be the foreign policy of  the United 
States that the [ICHEIC] should be regarded as the exclusive forum and remedy for claims within its 
purview,’ and that this policy applies to claims against Generali.”157  
 In Movsesian, the Ninth Circuit concluded that foreign affairs power may trump state law, 
but the court relied on Presidential speeches, various press statements, and letters to divine a foreign 
policy, not on an executive agreement.158  In that case, California passed a statute similar to Garamendi 
to provide relief  for Armenian insurance policy-holders.159  The Ninth Circuit first invalidated the 
law based on the Garamendi decision, even though there was no executive agreement, statute, or 
explicit statement of  Administration policy.160  The decision left open the possibility that statements 
by the White House could be sufficient to preempt state law.161  
 In a subsequent en banc review, the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed its original decision.  It 
concluded that the California statute “expresses a distinct point of  view on a specific matter of  
foreign policy” and, as a result, “intrudes on the federal government’s exclusive power to conduct 
and regulate foreign affairs.”162  To reach that conclusion, the Ninth Circuit evaluated Turkey’s 
ongoing concern regarding use of  the term “genocide” and reviewed articles regarding the 
Administration’s cautious avoidance of  that term.163  It made no mention of  a requirement for an 
executive agreement in claims settlement, nor did it identify a uniform test for preemption. 
 Finally, in the Von Saher case, the 9th Circuit explicitly rejected an executive agreement as 
a prerequisite for preemption in claims settlement.  In that case, the court invalidated a California 
statute extending the statute of  limitations on Holocaust-era art claims on grounds that the statute 
intruded on federal authority “to negotiate and establish” settlements to recovery Holocaust-era 
assets.164  The court dismissed arguments that World War II-era agreements were sufficient to 
157 Id. at 119.
158 See Movsesian I, 578 F.3d at 1061 (“The Executive Branch chose to address the issue through the medium of  
presidential speeches, not legislation: ‘The President believes that the proper way to address this issue and express our 
feelings about it is through the presidential message and not through legislation . . . . What [President Bush] wants is 
for the presidential message to be the thing that stands for the American response to this, not legislation passed by 
the House of  Representatives.’ See Press Release, White House Office of  the Press Secretary, Press Briefing by Dana 
Perino (Oct. 11, 2007). California has done what Congress declined to do: it has defied the President’s foreign policy 
preferences, and has undermined the President’s diplomatic power.”).
159 Movsesian I, 578 F.3d at 1054-55.
160 Id. at 1062 (“As in Garamendi, the express presidential foreign policy and the clear conflict raised by § 354.4 are 
‘alone enough to require state law to yield.’”).
161 See Buys, supra note 7, at 224-227 (analyzing “whether presidential policy alone could have the power to preempt 
state law.”).
162 See Movsesian II, 670 F.3d at 1076-77 (“Section 354.4 has ‘more than some incidental or indirect effect’ on foreign 
affairs. . . . The statute expresses a distinct political point of  view on a specific matter of  foreign policy. It imposes the 
politically charged label of  ‘genocide’ on the actions of  the Ottoman Empire (and, consequently, present-day Turkey) 
and expresses sympathy for ‘Armenian Genocide victim[s].’”).
163 Id.
164 See Von Saher, 592 F.3d at 967 (“The recovery of  Holocaust-era art affects the international art market, as well 
as foreign affairs. Many have called for the creation of  an international registration system, and a commission to settle 
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preempt state law and instead relied on the broad principle that only the federal government is 
capable of  reaching international settlements related to Holocaust assets.  There was no mention 
of  Medellin’s requirement of  a “longstanding practice” of  claims settlement or congressional 
acquiescence.
 Bottom line, courts rely on a variety of  interpretive tools to infer an executive policy, 
including lower-level officials’ statements, statements of  interest from the executive branch, 
Presidential speeches, and executive agreements.  The absence of  a formal test might not be 
problematic, since flexibility in formalizing an executive policy could be useful.  Nonetheless, lack of  
uniformity means that state laws could be preempted based on differing standards. 
 
conclusion
 This article constitutes an effort to examine the scope of  the Executive’s power to preempt 
state law where Congress has taken no action. In the realm of  foreign affairs, where both Congress 
and the President share power, at what point does Congress take the “lead role,” or at least play a 
critical function, in the Executive’s implementation of  foreign policy?
 Medellin reveals that the answer may be highly contextual. To the extent the U.S. continues to 
play a superpower role globally, the Executive will likely continue to play an outsized role in foreign 
affairs.165  However, during periods where the Executive is operating with a strong hand, such as a 
period of  armed conflict, the Court may want to see greater congressional involvement in foreign 
policy matters, including preemption of  state law.166  
 Similarly, the Court may read congressional inaction contextually.  Congress has a tough 
time legislating in foreign affairs, particularly where a problem lacks an easy solution, such as in the 
Holocaust insurance context.  The Court, as it did in Garamendi, may not allow congressional refusal 
or inability to take action, to inhibit claims settlement for a large group of  individuals.167  Yet where 
there is a pattern of  Executive efforts to bypass Congress, or where the Executive claims an outsized 
role in foreign affairs, the Court may take a more stringent view of  the President as lawmaker, as it 
did in Medellin. 
 These cases remain important as the Court takes on cases implicating Executive prerogative 
in foreign affairs.  For example, the Supreme Court ruled in 2012 on the justiciability of  a case 
involving legislative constraints on the President’s authority to issue passports, and it recently heard 
oral arguments in the same case.  The Zivotofksy case involved a U.S. citizen born in Jerusalem who 
sought to enforce statutory provisions regarding designation of  his birthplace as Israel.  Although 
the decision will focus on the President’s recognition power, at heart it involved questions regarding 
Nazi-looted art disputes. Only the federal government possesses the power to negotiate and establish these or other 
remedies with the international community.”).
165 See David Gartner, Foreign Relations, Strategic Doctrine, and Presidential Power, 63 ala. l. rev. 499, 534 (2012) (“The 
growing power of  the President in foreign relations reflects the emergence of  powerful doctrines that interpret the 
world and seek to justify unilateral action as essential to preserving security.”).
166 See Morrison, supra note 34.
167 See Von Saher, 592 F.3d at 967 (“[T]he federal government, ‘representing as it does the collective interests of  the . . 
. states, is entrusted with full and exclusive responsibility for the conduct of  affairs with foreign sovereignties.’”).
64 NATIONAL SECURITY LAW BRIEF Vol. 5, No. 1
congressional authority to legislate in foreign affairs.168  
 Beyond the judicial context, recent incidents involving Presidential use of  force highlight 
questions regarding the lawfulness of  unilateral executive action abroad.  For example, many 
Members expressed frustration with the President’s reliance on the 2001 AUMF to wage armed 
conflict against ISIL, sans explicit congressional approval.169  Likewise, the Iran nuclear negotiations 
will also constitute a key friction point between executive and legislative prerogative in foreign 
affairs.  An outstanding question remains under what circumstances Congress may take the lead in 
foreign policy. 
 Finally, in a globalized world, the notion of  a clean division between federal and state 
activity in foreign affairs – first articulated in Curtiss Wright and reaffirmed in Garamendi—may no 
longer be feasible.170  The Court simply cannot expect states to refrain from regulation of  matters 
that touch on foreign affairs given the far commercial reach of  businesses into states. The practical 
and constitutional line between State and Federal, executive and legislative responsibilities in 
foreign affairs remains unclear, but the two decisions discussed in this article provide a preview of  
the inevitable conflicts to come as both states and the Executive seek to shape the United States’ 
external affairs. 
168 See Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S.Ct. 1421 (2012); see also Note, Political Question Doctrine – Designation of  Passport 
Applicant’s Birthplace: Zivotofksy ex rel Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 126 harv. l. rev. 307 (2012).
169 See Sen. Tim Kaine, Obama Must Get Congress’s Backing for the Fight Against ISIS, n.y. times, Sept. 15, 2014, available 
at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/16/opinion/obama-must-get-congresss-backing-for-the-fight-against-isis.
html?_r=0. Members raised similar concerns following the President’s use of  force in Libya. See Charlie Savage, Attack 
Renews Debate Over Congressional Consent, n.y. times, (Mar. 21, 2011), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/22/
world/africa/22powers.html (“Some Democratic [and Republican] lawmakers . . . complained . . . that Mr. Obama had 
exceeded his constitutional authority by authorizing the attack without Congressional permission.”).
170 See Petition for a Writ of  Certiorari, Arzoumanian, supra note 44, at 26 (“This rule has dangerous implications in 
today’s exceedingly globalized and interconnected world…”).
